Chinese FDI hotspots in Europe face political shifts
72/ 100Hungary, Serbia, Spain, China
Summary
Political change in Europe's top destinations for Chinese greenfield investment threatens the relationships that secured multibillion-dollar factory and infrastructure pledges: Hungary's Viktor Orbán and Serbia's Aleksandar Vučić lost elections in April and October respectively, and Spain's Pedro Sánchez, who also courted Chinese manufacturers, has called snap elections for 29 November. Together the three countries attracted $41.4bn of Chinese greenfield FDI pledges between 2020 and September 2026, 43% of Europe's total. Hungary is reviewing CATL and BYD projects, and Serbia's new government may scrutinise Chinese-backed projects, though existing ties give Chinese firms reasons to stay.
Highlights
Together, these three countries attracted $41.4bn of Chinese greenfield FDI pledges between 2020 and September 2026, accounting for 43 per cent of Europe’s total in the period.
Projects associated with the previous governments’ political relationships with Beijing could come under particular scrutiny.
That model, where one friendly government could fast-track a multibillion project, is ending. Chinese capital will have to earn its licence to operate like any other investor.
Contrarian Viewpoints
- Scrutiny is not cancellation: Spain shows politically courted Chinese investment can coexist with regional oversight and trade-union involvement.
- Chinese greenfield FDI in Europe already peaked at $23.6bn in 2023 and fell to $10.8bn in 2025, so politics may be accelerating an existing decline rather than causing it.
Investment Implications
- Be selective on Chinese EV and battery investments in Hungary and Serbia pending permit and subsidy reviews, while favouring Spanish projects with stronger regional oversight.